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·MONTANA PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Bureau of Government Research, University of Montana, Missoula 59801

REPORT
Number 11--April 1972

Montana's Proposed Constitution of 1972
Interpretations .

Convention Process

By Ten Members
of the University Community

Leo C. Graybill, Jr., President
1972 Montana Constitutional Convention

On June 6, 1972, Montana voters will decide
whether to ratify a new constitution proposed to
them by the state's first constitutional convention
since statehood in 1889. This convention met briefly
to organize after delegates were elected in November 1971, and returned for substantive work January
17, 1972. Delegates signed the proposed constitution
on March 24, leaving just a bit more than two months
for citizens to evaluate the product. Copies of the
constitution will be officially distributed to voters
about the time this Report appears.
Ten members of the university community join
convention president Leo C. Graybill, Jr., in interpretive essays about the process of the convention, and
about the substance of its offering. The Report
makes no general recommendation whether the draft
constitution should be ratified; each voter will strike
a personal balance of judgment whether the proposed constitution better safeguards interests deemed
vital than does the existing constitution.
Each contributor, with special qualifications to discuss the assigned subject, was encouraged to express
personal judgments whether favorable or unfavorable. We think the interpretations are balanced and
provocative within each essay, and as a total product.
The interpretations and their authors are listed in
order of appearance in these pages and approximately in the order of treatment in the proposed constitution:
1. Convention Process: Leo C. Graybill, Jr.
2. Citizen Participation: Thomas Payne
3. Declaration of Rights: Emilie Loring
4. The Legislature: Ellis Waldron
5. The Executive: William F. Crowley
6. The Judiciary: Robert E. Sullivan
7. Revenue and Finance: Maxine C. Johnson
8. Environment and Resources: William Tomlinson and Clarence C. Gordon
9. Local Government: Robert E. Eagle
10. Education: J. Francis Rummel

Constitutional conventions don't happen every day,
and like many rare species, they have some unusual
characteristics. Let us take a close look at one-the
Montana constitutional convention of 1971-72.
Probably the most unique thing about any constitutional convention is its rarity. One occurs in most
American states once or twice in a century-perhaps
more frequently since World War II than for some
time before because of the many changes in our society since 1945.
Change is apparently both inevitable and continuous in social institutions. In modern times the rate
of change has been accelerating besides. Alvin Toffler, in "Future Shock," says:

( Continued on page 3)

There is widespread agreement, reaching from historians to archaeologists, all across the spectrum to
scientists, sociologists, economists and psychologists, that
many social processes are speeding up--strikingly, even
spectacularly.

Montana, in 1971, was a good example. It just isn't
at all like it was in 1889, when the first constitution
was adopted. And the old constitution hamstrings
Montana's government at many points at a time
when more and more is expected, even demanded of
government.
To be specific, legislative forms in the present constitution hamper and disrupt orderly lawmaking;
limitations on state debt and financing restrict necessary building and growth; overlapping and unwieldy
governmental units are uneconomic and yet unable
to cope with modern problems. Because of these and
similar developments, those interested in the political processes began to agitate-and the result was,
first, an executive reorganization program and later
a constitutional convention. The former probably
gave impetus to the latter, and it surely made ea.s ier
the work of the executive committee of the convention, which adopted executive reorganization in toto.
There can be no doubt of the influence on the Montana constitutional convention of two related developments early in 1971. First, the legislature had an
unusually hard time resolving its conflicts and required two special sessions after the r egular session
to complete its work. Legislators themselves were

2

sorely divided over the sales tax issue and governmental financing. People became "fed up" with the
legislative fiasco. Citizens were ready for, and deeply wanted, a change. At the same time, the Montana
supreme court ruled that no current legislators could
serve as constitutional convention delegates. This
left the field to newcomers, reformers, "nouveau"
politicians, and a few elder statesmen-and had a
great impact on the convention. The elected delegates were a sincere, intellectual, dedicated group,
without many deep political ties or preconceptions.
This resulted in a studious, inquiring and open convention. It has been described as a "populist,'' people-oriented convention.
In ordinary political affairs, neither the officeholders nor the public are encouraged to concern
themselves much ,with the future. The politicians
must get reelected; a bad law may be changed next
year; nobody polls the citizen on long-range, basic
planning. But at a constitutional convention it is
possible to affect the distant future. One problem
was to make the delegates aware of this and to draft
the constitution accordingly. The Montana constitutional convention used its distinguished speakers
series to try to awaken an historic view among the
delegates. The series included Jesse Unruh, Larry
Margolis, Charles A. Lindbergh, John Gardner and
Jeannette Rankin, each of whom brought to the delegates a unique outside viewpoint and historical context which helped set a tone for actual debate of the
constitutional articles.
Organizing a constitutional convention is a disquieting experience. There are few local precedents,
a consciousness of uninhibited freedom and a reluctance to copy other states too completely. A convention is really two operations-one administrative and
one substantive. Very little ties these functions together and there is a tendency to prefer substantive
matters (a place in history ?) to mundane administration. Yet without sound administration, a convention flounders, and the result could be disastrous.
Montana set up four procedural committees (rules,
administrative, public information and style and
drafting) and ten substantive committees. Each delegate served on only one substantive committee;
about half also served on one procedural committee.
Substantive committees were balanced politically
with Democrats, Republicans and Independents serving proportionately. More important, the chair manships and vice-chairmanships were alternated politically and also proportionately. E'ven within these
guidelines, eighty per cent of the delegates got their
first choice and eight percent their second choice of
committee assignments. These balanced committees,
each carefully including opposing inter ests wherever possible, w er e a key to delegate inter est, to good
committee work, and to the ultimate quality of the
articles handled by the committees.

Montana's committee chairmen went to school. A
special seminar was held on how to conduct the
committees. This resulted in some procedural uniformity, it increased efficiency, and contributed
greatly to the difficult task of completing committee
work on time. The committees prepared initial overviews, tentative drafts and a thorough final report,
all on a prearranged schedule, to help move the work
along. After its regular work each committee conducted a general public hearing based on its draft
article. These hearings were attended by other delegates and were useful in pre-educating them for the
debates that followed.
Debate in committee of the whole and in the convention lasted five weeks, sometimes including latenight sessions. Each section was debated separately
and reconsideration was freely allowed. The rules
were occasionally suspended to provide yet another
look at controversial sections. This seemed to be
justified because the convention was unicameral and
the subject matter might not again be opened for
debate for generations.
Debate was never limited in the convention. In
the committee of the whole delegates spoke as often
as they wished and offered as many amendments as
they chose. But a pattern did develop: whenever a
new general subject came up, discussion was unabated for one and one-half to two hours before any
serious attempt to vote. Discussion was generally
germane but not always strictly so. After such full
debate it was usually possible rather quickly to vote
on several varying amendments, to test several lines
of approach. By then consensus w as emerging.
Contrary to many legislative bodies, debate did
sway votes. This probably resulted both from the
quality and tenor of debate, which was high, but also
from the nature of the delegates, who were generally
uncommitted, interested and open to logical or reasonable suggestion. Outside pressures from lobbyists
or pr ess seemed only to sharpen the debate and to
bring on a certain stubborn independence in the
body. The convention was conscious of its historical
role and did not take lightly its duty to deliberate on
behalf of the public.
Constitutional conventions are the tap roots ,of
Democracy. Openly conducted, they bring the people, through their delegates, face to face with what
government is all about. At such conventions, society
must arrange its priorities, safeguard its basic beliefs
and order its future. This is a large order under the
best of circumstances and the wonder is that men
and women from diverse backgrounds, with different
interests and with limited time and r esources can
successfully undertake the task. In 1972, in Helena,
Montana, one hundred men and women did so successfully. Montana had a good constitutional convention.

•
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Interpretations

Citizen Participation

(Continued from page 1)

Professor Thomas Payne
Department of Political Science
University of Montana, Missoula

The convention called its product "The Proposed
1972 Constitution for the State of Montana." This
Report also refers to the document as the "draft
constitution."
The framework of government established for
Montana in its 1889 statehood constitution has been
little changed by 37 amendments. Substantial interest in general constitutional revision came to be expressed after the state's "little federal" legislature
was reapportioned by a federal district court in 1965.
The 1967 legislative assembly proposed constitutional
amendments (both defeated in 1968) to lengthen its
biennial sessions from 60 calendar days to 80 calendar
days, and to increase from three to six, the number of
am·endments it might submit to the people in any
general election. It also directed the Legislative
Council to study the need for general constitutional
revision; the Council found "less than half of the
document [to be] adequate in its present form';" The
1969 Legislative Assembly created a constitutional
revision commission to continue study of the constitution and placed a referendum for call of a constitutional convention on the 1970 general election ballot. The referendum passed by a vote of 133,482 to
71,643, and the 1971 legislature passed enabling legislation for the convention whose delegates were
elected in November 1971. The 1971 legislature also
created a 16-member constitutional convention commission to prepare for the convention. In a period
of a little more than six months, a research staff
compiled several thousand pages of materials for
use by the convention, and prepared physical arrangements for its operations. Public Affairs Report Number 9, January 1972, described background,
election and organization of "The 1971-1972 Montana
Constitutional Convention." Bureau research associate Elizabeth Eastman, who wrote that report, assisted at every stage in the preparation of this issue.
Emilie Loring, a former research associate of the
bureau now enrolled in the Law School, is a contributor to this issue. Robert Eagle, who joined the
university this year, will bring youthful energies and
fresh insights to direction of the Bureau next year.
Thomas Payne, my esteemed colleague for two decades, has shared every important decision and many
of the menial tasks in preparation of this Report.
That each contributor to this Report met every insistent deadline attests their deep concern and personal involvement in the important public decision
to be made by Montana voters June 6.
Ellis Waldron, Director
Bureau of Government Research

The proposed constitution establishes procedures
by which Montana citizens may participate directly
in their own governance. These procedures are embodied in articles dealing with suffrage and elections,
general government, and constitutional revision. At
a period in our national history when complaints
often are voiced about the remoteness or unresponsiveness of political institutions, it is especially appropriate that Montanans be fully informed as to the
opportunities afforded them for participation in government under the proposed constitution.
Viewed in the broadest sense, the provisions of the
1972 constitution in their entirety afford many avenues for participation by the people in their government. Those sections of the constitution singled out
for analysis here provide the specific means by which
all citizens, whether or not they hold elective or appointive offices, may vote, elect their officials, initiate legislative measures, rescind unacceptable measures passed by the legislature, and take effective part
in amending the constitution. Taken together, the
provisions of the 1972 constitution regarding citizen
participation continue an established American tradition both of representative government and of
popular involvement, while reaffirming and enlarging the populist tradition which has been so distinctive to Montana and to the American West.
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTIONS
The draft constitution essentially retains provisions
of the present constitution relating to suffrage and
elections, but uses about half as many words. None
of the provisions to be deleted from the present constitution is of great significance, nor does the new
constitution introduce drastic or untested innovations, excepting possibly legislative discretion to authorize poll booth registration.
Eligibility and Qualifications: To qualify to vote in
Montana, a person must be a citizen of the United
States, at least 18 years of age, or older, and meet
registration and residence requirements determined
by the legislature. The age requirement is that required by the recent 26th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution; eligibility requirements are similar to
those found in most states. A person otherwise qualified may be denied voter privileges on two grounds:
imprisonment for committing a felony, or court determination that the prospective elector is of unsound
mind.
Eligibility for office holding is identical to that of
voters, except that the legislature may add qualifications and the draft constitution specifies additional
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qualifications for certain elective offices. A person
convicted of a felony would become eligible to hold
office upon final discharge from state supervision,
without the present requirement of a pardon or citizenship restoration by the governor.
Registration: The legislature would establish a system of voter registration, and also "may provide for
a system of poll booth registration." The present system of voter registration in Montana leaves much to
be desired. Failure to register is cited by nonvoters
as the most common reason for non-voting. But all
democratic systems find, especially as their populations become increasingly urbanized, that some form
of voter registration before election day is needed to
establish that the prospective voter is actually eligible. Poll booth registration would eliminate the
present safeguards against such well-known election
frauds as "repeating" and "colonizing." The legislature is free, of course, to ignore poll booth registration and to enact future registration statutes as circumstances may require.
Election Procedures: The. legislature is required to
provide procedures for the conduct of elections. The
provisions that the winning candidate in an election
need have only a plurality of the vote and that a
voter is immune from arrest, unless caught in committing an actionable offense while at the polls or enroute to or from the polls, are retained from the present constitution.
Suffrage and election provisions of the draft constitution would be a substantial improvement over those
of the present constitution. Broad discretionary authority has been granted to the legislature, while adequate safeguards protect the citizen's interest in free
and fair elections.
GENERAL GOVERNMENT
A variety of provisions not easily fitted elsewhere
into the draft constitution were brought together
here. Their general effect would continue the spirit,
if not the letter, of the present constitution. A notable
exception is the option that would enable the legislature to legalize gambling, one of three separate issues that will appear on the ratification ballot.
Direct Legislation: The initiative and referendum
provisions of the present constitution are liberalized
in the draft constitution. Both initiative and referendum petitions would require signatures of 5 per
cent of the voters; by comparison initiatives now require 8 per cent of the voters. Distributive provisions
for both initiative and referendum petitions would
require the minimum percentage of signatures in onethird of the legislative districts (which could be
largely urban) instead of the present two-fifths of the
counties-a substantial concession to the state's urban
populations, as against the rural veto implicit in the
present requirement.
Gambling: The present provision which prohibits
the legislature or the people from legalizing gambling is retained, but a separate issue on the June

ballot permits voters to opt for ai;i. alternate provision
which would empower the legislature to legalize
"forms of gambling, lotteries, or gift enterprises."
Under the 'optional gambling provision, the people
could legalize gambling directly through the initiative.
Those who espouse gambling as a panacea for
Montana's financial ills should be admonished that
elsewhere (with the exception of New Jersey's lottery) it has failed to produce revenues at the level
promised by its proponents. Moreover, additional
law enforcement costs and social costs in rising incidence of gambling-associated crime suggest that the
introduction of gambling into this state would exact
a substantial, if not fully visible, price.
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
Present Procedures Retained: The draft constitution retains amendment processes of the present constitution essentially unchanged, but introduces an
important new process as well, the popular initiative
of constitutional amendments. It also eliminates the
present limitation of three amendments which the
legislature may submit in a single general election.
The present constitution may be amended either: (1)
by legislative proposal and popular ratification; or
(2) by proposal of a convention summoned by joint
action of the legislature and people and by popular
ratification of convention proposals.
New Amendment Procedures: (1) Voters could bypass the legislature in the initiative and ratification
of amendments. Petitions to initiate an amendment
would require signatures of 10 per cent of the voters,
with at least 10 per cent in each of two-fifths of the
legislative districts (not counties); the initiative
amendment would be adopted if approved by a majority of those voting on the question. (2) A similar
initiative approach could be used by the people to
call a convention. (3) The question of calling a convention must be placed on the general election ballot
once in every twenty years. (4) There would be no
limit on the number of amendments that could be
submitted to the people by the legislature at any one
general election. (5) The legislature could specify
that delegates to future conventions be elected on a
nonpartisan ballot.
Comment; With the changes indicated, the amending process would be much easier than'. under the
present constitution. Of the five changes listed, all
but one have merit. The exception is the initiative to
adopt single amendments. It has been neither a successful nor an effective mode of revision in states that
have employed it. Well-financed, articulate minority
interests have found the initiative to be a handy
weapon to exploit. More positively, the initiative may
be viewed as a popular safeguard against legislative
inaction on demands for constitutional change. It
does seem less essential as a safeguard in a constitution which affords other, more liberalized opportunities for change.
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Declaration of Rights
Emilie Loring
The School of Law
University of Montana, Missoula
Montana's 1972 constitutional convention, as expected, drafted a strong declaration of rights. The
proposed article preserves essential rights presently
protected, adds important new rights, clarifies present language and deletes some obsolete provisions of
the present constitution.
Substantive Rights: Traditional rights of self-government, inalienable rights, freedom of speech, press,
assembly and religion and the right to bear arms all
would be retained, although some have been rephrased. Additional substantive rights would be
guaranteed. A strongly phrased new clause would
protect against discrimination on the basis of race,
color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or for
political or religious ideas. Protection would be
given against both private (by any person, firm, corporation or institution) and governmental discrimination; this would extend protections presently afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. The present national constitution does
not yet protect against discrimination on the basis of
sex. The reference to culture would protect American Indians, Montana's largest ethnic minority.
A right to individual privacy is a significant innovation, expressly mentioned in only three other state
constitutions. The right is not enumerated in the
national constitution but its existence has been suggested in some modern Supreme Court decisions.
Another important new right would be that of
citizens to participate in the operation of government, to examine documents and to observe the deliberations of all agencies of government. The "right
to know" would also be affirmed, except where "demands of individual privacy would clearly exceed
the merits of public disclosure." When governmental
agencies accumulate vast amounts of essentially private information, sometimes erroneous, serious infringements of privacy elsewhere guaranteed by the
draft article could occur if all government files were
opened to the public. Examples would be the names
of natural parents in adoption proceedings and the
names of persons seeking public health treatment for
venereal disease. Segments of the Montana press
have objected to this exception that would protect
personal privacy; it may be hoped they will reevaluate their opposition.
The traditional sovereign immunity of the state
from suit would be eliminated. Montana would join
more than two-thirds of the states to permit suit for
personal or property injury against either the state
or its political subdivisions. The draft constitution
would absolutely forbid suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, the basic historic judicial mechanism
to challenge detention and protect personal liberty.

Restoration of all rights to one convicted of crime,
after termination of state supervision for that crime,
would be a significant new right. Presently the restoration of political rights depends upon the governor, and there is now no provision to restore occupational rights to a felon who has discharged his debt
to society.
The proposed constitution reaffirms that lands
owned or held by Indians or Indian tribes shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of
congress until revoked by the consent of the United
States and Montana. This provision was required by
the 1889 enabling act under which the territory of
Montana became a state. A number of Indians testified at the convention, insisting that the disclaimer
of state jurisdiction over Indian lands be retained,
although there have been assertions that the provision is no longer necessary. Congress has given states
permission to amend such constitutional disclaimers
when the state wishes to assume criminal and civil
jurisdiction over reservations. Montana, except for
criminal jurisdiction over the Flathead Reservation,
apparently is not prepared to accept the financial and
administrative burdens of assuming such jurisdiction
and it is therefore doubtful if the disclaimer could be
eliminated. Although present national legislation requires Indian tribes to assent to state jurisdiction,
there is no state constitutional or legislative provision requiring tribal agreement; the present disclaimer provision is important to Montana Indians.
Procedural Rights: Basic procedural rights such
as due process of law, freedom from unreasonable
searches, right to counsel, to reasonable bail, and
against compulsory self-incrimination have been retained in the draft constitution. It also proposes additional protections beyond those now guaranteed. A
criminal defendant may not now waive jury trial (to
be tried by a judge) in felony cases. The new bill of
rights would permit such waiver, giving the defendant the choice whether jury or judge would try the
facts. This has been possible in the federal courts
and in about half the states and it is desirable for
Montana.
The presumption of innocence would be strengthened by requiring a unanimous verdict in all criminal cases. The present constitution permits a twothirds verdict in misdemeanor cases. A basic proposition of Anglo-American law is that guilt in a criminal case must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt;
if a third of a jury of one's peers is not convinced of
guilt, the prosecution has not met this burden of
proof.
Presently juvenile proceedings are not considered
to be criminal, thus basic rights afforded adults
may be denied to young people. A new provision
would assure that the rights of those under the age
of majority (eighteen) will include all the fundamental protections of the declaration of rights. The
United States Supreme Court has been moving toward guarantees of basic rights of juveniles in sev-
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eral important ways. If a young person in a first
confrontation with the judicial system may be denied
the right to counsel, to confront his accusers, to a
speedy jury trial and to other protections afforded
adult defendants, it may be difficult to convince that
youth of the fairness of "the system."
Some of the draft provisions have been criticized
on the ground that they are not "self-enforcing" in
the manner of most protections in the federal bill of
rights. On the national level freedom of the press is
secured by the express prohibition that "Congress
shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or
press" and that "no state shall ... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." An -injured party may enforce these rights
directly by court action against the public official or
agency attempting to enforce a law alleged to violate
the constitution.
The draft declaration of rights states that "all persons have the right to a clean and healthful environment . . . and of pursuing life's basic necessities."
This is not self-enforcing; an individual probably
could not effectively enforce this right in a court
of law because no legal duty has been placed on
government. But the 1889 constitution also imposed
moral duties on the legislature. For example, the
constitution now provides that the legislature has the
duty to establish a system of public schools. Those
who want public kindergartens or more vocational
training go to the legislature, not to the courts. Similarly those who seek environmental legislation may
find it helpful to have statements of basic state policy
in the constitution. The legislature would have the
power to act in environmental and social welfare
areas under either the old or the new constitution.
Citizens desiring stronger legislation to protect environmental and cultural rights should consider
whether the proposed legislative structure will be
more conducive to such a legislative product. The
assertion of rights to clean and healthful environment in the declaration of rights and in the environment and resources article will need legislative action and executive energies to accomplish affirmative results.
The declaration of rights in the proposed constitution reaffirms present provisions and declares additional rights. The improvements are probably not
sufficient in themselves to swing votes for the proposed document. I find the new declaration of rights
better, both in procedural protections and in political
philosophy. If one has serious reservations about
other sections, the new declaration of rights, alone;
is not such an improvement as to warrant an affirmative vote. If the new document is defeated and we
are left with the existing constitution, the present
declaration of rights is satisfactory and we could
expand protections through legislative action or constitutional amendment.

The Legislature
Professor Ellis Waldron
Department of Political Science
University of Montana, Missoula
A new state legislature is offered by the draft constitution, substantially more modern and predictably
more responsive to citizen interests and desires than
the present legislative assembly. However modest
the changes proposed for other elements of state and
local government, the convention delegates demonstrated substantial discontent with the existing legislature, and proposed important changes.
Unicameral Legislature: This is one of three special
referendum options; if a majority of the voters approve the general draft constitution and the special
unicameral option, the legislature would become a
single chamber of 90 to 105 members in 1975. Experience with the innovation would be reviewed by the
voters after five years, in 1980; disapproval of the
experiment would return the legislature to the bicameral form provided in the new constitution. Legislators (called senators) in the unicameral body
would serve for four years, half elected each biennium.
Significant changes are proposed in the legislative
branch, whether the unicameral or bicameral form is
chosen in June.
Mode of Election: All legislators would be elected
from single-member districts; that is, each citizen
would vote for and be represented by one senator
only, or by one senator and one representative in the
bicameral form. Present multi-member representation of the sort that elects 18 legislators at-large in
Yellowstone County, 18 in Cascade County and 12 in
Missoula County would be terminated. Voters in populous centers would elect their representative (bicameral) or senator (unicameral) from a neighborhood district about the size of one or two wards; the
senator in a bicameral legislature would be elected
from two representative districts combined. Proponents of the single member district believe it heightens responsibility and communication between legislator and constituent. In the major urban centers
where a county comprises several legislative districts,
the legislator need not reside in the district but must
reside in the county. Voters in rural areas would
elect their single senator and representative (if the
legislature is bicameral) from a district comprising
parts or all of several counties that hopefully would
share some community of interest. Terms of service
in the bicameral option would remain as at present,
four years for senators and two years for representatives .
Qualifications: Legislators must be 18 years old,
resident for a year in the state and for six months in
the county or district. Salary would be fixed by a
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state salary commission and no session could increase
its own compensation.
Sessions: The legislature would meet regularly
every year rather than odd-numbered years. Length
of session would be sixty legislative days rather than
sixty consecutive calendar days. A four- or five-day
legislative week would allow most legislators to
spend weekends at home with their constituents. The
session would extend into April rather than early
March as at present. This would afford some relief
from the terrible time strictures that now minimize
citizen access and exaggerate the dependence of
everyone upon full-time lobbyists for well-heeled
special interests.
All hearings, committee meetings and formal sessions must be public, with a record of "every vote of
each member" on "each substantive question" in committee or general sessions. These requirements would
open up all stages of the formal legislative process to
public view; they might also lead to greater use of
the party caucus for essential decisions, and to
stronger party discipline. They would stretch out the
time required for process and build pressure on the
sixty-day session limit.
But the legislature itself could extend the length
of subsequent sessions if the sixty-day limitation
proved to be too rigorous; statute or resolution could
increase future sessions to perhaps 75 or 90 legislative days without requiring a constitutional amendment. The legislature also could call itself into special session "at written request of a majority of the
members." It would not need a governor's call for a
tandem extension of the regular session. The governor might call fewer special sessions because he could
no longer limit the subject matter to be considered in
a session he called.
Organization and Process: Each chamber would
elect its own officers and the lieutenant governor
would no longer preside in the senate. Measures
pending at adjournment of the first session in a biennium would carry over to subsequent sessions within
the biennium, as in Congress. Judicial challenge to a
statute for conformity to prescribed constitutional
standards must be brought within two years of its
effective date. Several traditional requirements for
the legislative process would be retained, such as limitation of bills to a single subject clearly stated in the
title, enactment by a majority of all members present
and voting, and prohibition of non-appropriation
"riders" to appropriation bills.
The draft legislative article is significant for what
it did not carry over from the present constitution.
Gone are the detailed lists of proscribed local, special
and special-interest laws; there is a simple prohibition of local and special laws where a general law
could serve, and there is a single section prohibiting
appropriations to enumerated types of private individuals and associations. Procedural relics of the 18th

century such as requirements of three readings (from
a time when rapid printing of bills was not even a
dream) and that appropriations must originate in the
lower house (because royal governors had appointed
members of colonial upper chambers and the U. S.
Senate represented states without regard to their
taxable wealth) have been dropped. Also gone are
archaic and unworkable corrupt practices codes and
some other red-plush Victorian touches. But the legislature is charged to enact a general code of ethics
for all public officers and employees, state and local,
to prohibit conflict between public duty and private
interest.
The governor would retain the item veto in appropriation measures, gain an amendatory veto in which
he could indicate what provisions would be acceptable, and lose the pocket veto; the legislature could
reconvene itself to override an end-of-session veto.
Reapportionment: Upon ratification of the new
charter and after each federal census, redistricting
for legislative and congressional elections would be
accomplished by a five-member commission, whose
members could hold no public office. Majority and
minority legislative leaders would designate four
members who would then select a fifth member to
serve as chairman. The legislature could recommend
changes in the commission's districting plan, but
these changes need not be accepted. Within limits
set by the constitution and statutes, the commission
might fix the precise size of the legislature; but each
senate district must comprise two house districts, in
the bicameral form; and all districts must be compact,
of contiguous territory and as nearly equal in population as practicable. One member would be apportioned to each senate and house district.
Legislative Duties: Perhaps to a greater degree
than in the present constitution, the new legislature
would be charged with important affirmative responsibilities: to implement numerous "new" rights listed
in the declaration of rights that would not be r~adily
enforceable by court suit in the absence of legislative
standards; to effectuate Article IX on protection of
environment and of natural and cultural resources;
and to establish a consumer counsel who would represent the public in rate-setting processes. All doubt
about legality of interim research and study would
be removed, and a legislative post-audit would have
constitutional status.
Direct or Popular Legislation: Liberalized provisions for initiative and referendum suggest that direct legislation outside the assembly could become
more common. Moreover, constitutional amendments
could be proposed by popular initiative and adopted
without involvement of the legislature. But the legislature would no longer be limited in the number of
constitutional amendments it could submit in a single
election, and the governor would no longer share in
the proposal of constitutional amendments.
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The Executive
Professor William F. Crowley
The School of Law
University of Montana, Missoula
Executive Director, Commission on
Executive Reorganization
The proposed constitution would extensively
change the form of the executive article. It is substantially shortened and the status of some offices is
significantly changed. The office of state treasurer
is removed from the constitution, which may lead to
its elimination as an elective office by a future legislature. (The change obviously downgrades the treasurer's status.) The office of lieutenant governor is
considerably enhanced. The proposed constitution
plainly intends that the lieutenant governor become
a fulltime officer. It would require the governor and
lieutenant governor to run as a team in both the primary and general elections. The lieutenant governor
would be freed of his present duty to preside over
the senate and might become a fulltime deputy governor with extensive powers. This change would
certainly strengthen the governor's office and staff
both in dealing with the legislature and with the
executive bureaucracy. Conditions under which the
lieutenant governor takes over the governor's office
in case of death or disability of the governor are for
the first time clearly outlined.
The status of other present elective offices-secretary of state, attorney general, superintendent of
public instruction and auditor-would be generally
unchanged.
A number of constitutional boards would be eliminated. The board of examiners, board of pardons,
board of prison commissioners, and the state depository board will no longer be constitutional entities
if the new constitution is accepted. Constitutional
status for the appointed state examiner also would
be eliminated.
The 20 department limitation adopted by the voters in 1970 would be retained, but reorganization
options would be narrowed by the constitutional
status to be accorded to departments of agriculture
and of labor and industry by Article XII.
The governor's relationship with the legislature is
expressed in considerable detail. The gov.e rnor's veto
power, which presently allows him to veto an entire
bill or a single item in an appropriations bill, is retained and the governor is granted the additional
power to return a bill for suggested amendments.
This measurable expansion of the gubernatorial veto
power has been partly balanced by ·e limination of the
pocket veto. If the governor currently fails to approve a bill which is in his office at the adjournment
of the legislature, it does not become a law; this
failure to sign is, in effect, a veto. The proposed constitution would require the governor to sign or to

veto every piece of legislation. If arty are vetoed
after adjournment, the legislature could reconvene to
uphold or override the veto.
The shortening of the article and elimination of a
number of boards and of some appointive and elective officers appears to mark important progress and,
in some respects, it does. In ·other ways, however, the
actual change is small. The eliminated boards had
already lost practically all of their powers through
past legislative action. The board of examiners, originally a kind of super-board of county commissioners
handling all state business, presently has power only
to authorize construction contracts (usually a mere
formality), to select architects for state building
projects, and to review claims against the state for
which no money is appropriated for forwarding to
the legislature. The board of prison commissioners
ceased to function when the state board of institutions was created. The board of pardons was given
constitutional standing at its creation only because
it was necessary to amend the governor's plenary
powers of pardon or commutation to permit the board
to function. It will undoubtedly continue to operate
with little or no change. The state depository board
was moribund for years and under executive reorganization its functions have been transferred to the
department of administration.
The state examiner's office was intended as a
watchdog over state government to inform the governor when other elected officials were not handling
state money according to law. The office was never
given the statutory powers or financial resources to
carry out this assignment. Its primary function now
is to be financial watchdog over cities and counties,
a function which it will no doubt continue to perform. The job of checking the financial dealings of
state agencies has been given to the legislative auditor; the examiner has no real function left at the
state level.
Elimination of the only elective officer touched by
the proposed revision, the state treasurer, involves
other considerations. The treasurer now performs
functions of more importance and magnitude than
the state auditor, one of the officers retained in the
constitution. His powers, although different, are of
at least equal importance to those exercised by the
secretary of state, an office also retained.
Strong argument could be made, and was made
during the convention, that none of these subsidiary
offices should be included in the constitution and
that the fragmentation of power and duties among so
many elective officials inevitably works against efficiency and responsibility in government. Elimination of elected officials other than the treasurer was
rejected by the convention for political considerations and not because the assembly felt that independent constitutional or elective status of these officials was necessary to good government. A majority
of the delegates feared the demonstrated vote-get-
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ting power of these minor elected officials and hesitated to have it turned against the proposed constitution. The treasurer is the only officer of this group
ineligible to succeed himself. Obviously, there is
little to fear politically from elimination of the treasurer.
The present constitution also gives certain executive departments of government constitutional status.
There is no real reason why some departments exist
at the constitutional level while others are authorized only by statute. Each of these departments was
added to the original constitution by amendment
obviously in deference to the wishes of a particular
group as a directive to the legislature to create a
department to specialize in certain affairs. Constitutional status in these cases is more symbolic than
real. The constitution does not provide what powers
or duties must be given so the constitutional department can be completely ineffectual. One of the
prime objectives of new state constitutions everywhere has been to eliminate constitutional status of
divisions within the general functional brancheslegislative, executive and judicial.
The convention, in an obvious concession to powerful pressure groups and in an equally obvious bid to
gain the support or at least to prevent the hostility
of these groups, recreated constitutional departments of agriculture and of labor. As in the present
constitution no specific powers were allocated and
no directives for legislation were given. The result
is the same symbolic status that these departments
have constitutionally enjoyed in the past.
Even though the delegates refused to face up to
the major issue of executive revision, the proposed
draft represents a small plus. The boards and offices
eliminated, although presently nonfunctional, could
currently be reactivated and cause a dangerous and
undesirable fragmentation of executive power and
responsibility. Their elimination removes this threat,
however remote. Removing the treasurer's constitutional status may allow concrete demonstration
that constitutional rank and elective selection of
minor state officials is unnecessary.
Upgrading the office of lieutenant governor represents an interesting and possibly fruitful experiment,
although the requirement that the governor and lieutenant governor run as a team in the primary election may prove awkward and politically treacherous.
The proposal retains the most important executive
change of modern times-the 20 department limitation. Confining the executive to 20 principal divisions permits significant gains in efficiency and responsibility despite some fragmentation caused by
the multiplicity of elected officials, whose operations
are not to be counted among the 20.
The draft executive article, if adopted, will be a
gain though a small one. Saddled as we are with
cumbersome and antiquated governmental machinery we cannot afford to reject even small gains.

The Judiciary
Dean Robert E. Sullivan
The School of Law
University of Montana, Missoula
The convention rejected the majority report of its
judiciary committee, voted to debate the minority
report and adopted it with several modifications. In
comparison to the present constitution many things
remain unchanged. A unified court organization was
not adopted. The present three tiers of courts, namely the supreme court, district courts and justices of
the peace would be retained, and their autonomous
operation preserved. The creation and change of judicial districts and the number of district judges to
be authorized would remain in legislative control.
Election of judges would be retained with supreme
court and district judges to be selected as now on a
nonpartisan ballot and justices of the peace on a
partisan ballot.
New Provisions: Changes proposed include lengthening the elective terms of all judges-supreme court
from six years to eight, district court from four years
to six and justice of the peace from two years to four.
The legislature could increase the size of the supreme
court from five justices to seven and "create such
other courts as may he provided by law." The justice
of the peace would retain status as a constitutional
officer; the number would be reduced from at least
two in each organized township to at least one in
each county but "the legislature may provide for additional justices" in each county. They would be paid
"monthly compensation" and provided facilities to
perform their duties "in dignified surroundings."
A significant addition is the proposal to create a
"judicial standards commission" with authority to
investigate complaints, conduct confidential proceedings and make recommendations to the supreme
court for the removal and discipline of judges. The
commission would consist of two district judges, one
attorney and two citizens who are neither judges nor
attorneys.
A less significant change would be made -in the
selection and retention of judges and in the filling of
vacancies that occur during an elected term of office.
The provisions would apply to the supreme court and
to district courts. If an incumbent judge did not run
again there would be an election on a nonpartisan
ballot. Otherwise, the election would be a contested
one if an opponent to the incumbent judge filed for
the office. If no opponent filed the incumbent judge
would have to stand for approval or rejection in the
general election on the basis of his record. Limitations would be imposed upon the discretion of the
chief executive in making appointments to fill vacancies that occur during the term of office of a supreme court justice or a district court judge. A replacement would have to be appointed from nomi-

r
10

nees selected as the legislature would provide. The
replacement must be confirmed by the senate and at
the first election following confirmation and after
each succeeding term there must be the conventional
nonpartisan election which might or might not be
contested. In comparison to the existing method of
appointment by the governor and to the merit plan
of selection in effect in many states, this would be a
cumbersome process and not an improvement of
present arrangements.
There would be several significant deletions from
authority that exists in the present constitution. The
assignment of judges by the supreme court from one
district or county to another for temporary service
could be done under the proposed judicial article
only "upon request of the district judge." This is not
compatible with efficient administration of the work
of courts and with the flexibility necessary to accommodate the administration of justice to emerging
problems of our society. Rules of procedure would
be "subject to disapproval by the legislature in either
of the two sessions following promulgation." This
would impede an essential function of the supreme
court and it disregards the inherent powers of the
court as a separate independent entity in a tripartite
allocation of governmental authority. An innocuous
modernization would delete constitutional status of
the clerk of the supreme court as an elective office.
Comment: Evaluation of the proposed judicial
article presupposes some standard of comparison.
The Consensus of the Conference of Montana Citizens
for Court lmprovement in 1966 enumerated minimal
requirements for modernization and improvement in
the Montana judicial system. Of judicial selection
and tenure, the Consensus provided: "The non-partisan election system of selecting the judges has not
succeeded in removing the Montana judiciary from
political pressures and uncertainties. To succeed in
bringing the lawyers best qualified for judicial office
to the bench of this State, selection of judges should
be made by a system based entirely upon merit."
The proposed article does not permit merit selection
of candidates to succeed an incumbent judge not
seeking reelection at the end of a term. Non-partisan
election would be continued. Merit selection to fill
vacancies during a term of office would be ineffective under the requirement of senate confirmation
and non-partisan election.
In the matter of court organization and administration, the Consensus concluded that " ... a unified
court system is more desirable than the present autonomous system of courts in Montana today." The
continuation of three levels of courts and the deletion
of proposed express authority for administrative supervision -over lower courts in the section on supreme
court jurisdiction reflect a policy decision to limit the
exercise of control by the supreme court. Although
there is a provision for "general supervisory control

over all other courts" comments to the minority report of the convention judiciary committee indicate
that the phrase did not include administrative control. The minority report provided for " ... general
supervisory and administrative control over all
courts." Its comment states: "This addition [administrative control] was made to clarify the supervisory
powers of the supreme court and to permit the supreme court to exercise centralized administrative
direction for the entire judicial system." Deletion of
this authority in the draft article effectively preserves the present autonomous system of courts
noted in the Citizens Consensus.
In the matter of courts of limited and special jurisdiction the Citizens Consensus provided:
"The type and quality of justice presently being provided in these courts could be materially
improved by adoption of a unified court system
which would provide a district court level of
judicial quality for all legal proceedings. This
unified court system might be materially implemented by incorporating within it a provision
whereby, where needed, district court judges
might select persons to act as deputy judges or
magistrates to assist the district court in supplying continuous court representation in remote
areas of this state."
To preserve justices of the peace as elective constitutional officers and to omit authorization for supervision of their judicial activities within the court system are effective prohibitions of a unified court system.
Amendments to the minority report of the judiciary committee during floor debate also created inconsistencies in the judicial article. The continuance of justices of the peace as constitutional offices
and the requirement of one justice for each county
may nullify the creation of small claims courts,
because the possibility of securing justices of the
peace who have the legal education usually considered to be requisite for claims adjudication is remote
in counties with small population. The legislature
may provide "jurisdiction concurrent with that of
the district court" for other courts. However, the
absence of authority in the supreme court to supervise and coordinate the activities of other courts
limits the flexibility of this provision.
Other standards for comparison are available.
What have states similar in geography and population to Montana done? Whether these measures or
the Consensus Statement of the Citizens Conference
be used as the basis for comparison, it appears that
improvements proposed are not significant, while restrictions limit the flexibility to prepare for the problems of the future; the expectation of modernization
and improvement in the administration of justice is
minimal. Other articles of the proposed constitution
may offset these inadequacies. This is conjectural.
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Revenue and Finance
Mrs. Maxine Johnson
Associate Professor of Business Administration
University of Montana, Missoula
The revenue and finance article is a testament to
the belief in representative government held by
members of Montana's constitutional convention.
Rather than fill the article with constitutional limitations which might serve as hindrances to effective
government, they opted, in most cases, for legislative
discretion in fiscal affairs. In general, the article is a
short and simple statement of guidelines for state
fiscal policy.
The Positive: A number of interesting changes
were made in the provisions for property tax administration. The state government would be charged
with responsibility for appraising, assessing, and
equalizing the valuation of all taxable property. In
part, this provision was dictated by recent court cases
in other states which have found inequalities in local
school funding unconstitutional and which may result
in widespread state funding of public schools. There
is no guarantee, of course, that state government will
do a better job of equalizing the impact of property
taxes than county offices have done in the past. Taxpayers may hope, however, that the inequities which
presently exist within and among taxing districts can
be reduced through statewide administration of the
property tax. Taxpayers also should recognize that
this section, plus the removal of the two mill limit for
state purposes, opens the door to property taxation
for state as well as local government activities.
Section 5 exempts from the property tax all United
States, state, and local government property, property of charitable institutions, nonprofit hospitals,
and burial ·grounds, plus property used strictly for
religious worship or educational purposes. Other decisions as to what property, if any, to exempt are up
to the legislature. They may, for example, choose to
continue the gross proceeds tax in lieu of the property tax on mines. They may, if they wish, abandon
the pretense that such property as securities and
bank accounts are presently being taxed and expressly exempt them from taxation.
If the new constitution is approved, disgruntled
property taxpayers will have a new appeal procedure,
to be established by the legislature, at their disposal.
No longer will the same agency do the assessing and
handle the complaints.
The new constitution leaves the administrative details of the tax system to the legislature. It does not
provide for constitutional tax boards at either the
state or local level. The new state tax agency will be
established by the legislature and administered by
the executive branch of government. This is in contrast to the existing state board of equalization,

which is constitutionally ordained and independent
of both the executive and legislative branches.
The new revenue and finance article would omit
the section of the old constitution which had been
construed to prohibit state revenue sharing with local
governments. If the new con.s titution is approved,
then constitutional limitations will no longer be a
deterrent to increased state aid to local governments.
The new article does not prescribe debt limits for
state and local governments; they are properly left to
the discretion of the legislature. It requires a balanced budget; the state may not go into debt to cover
deficits incurred because appropriations exceeded
anticipated revenue. And no state debt (for construction of public buildings, etc.) could be created unless
authorized by a "two-thirds vote of the members of
each house of the legislature or a majority of the
electors voting thereon.'' These provisions seem reasonable and appropriate.
The Negative: Not everyone, of course, will be
happy with all the article's provisions. This writer
has two major reservations. In a bow to the highway
lobby, the delegates retained the earmarking of revenue from gross vehicle weight fees and excise and
license taxes (except general sales and use taxes) on
gasoline, fuel, and other energy sources for highway
purposes (Section 6). The new constitution does allow more flexibility than the old in that registration
fees and the tax on new cars are not earmarked. And
the permissible uses of earmarked funds have been
expanded to include local government road and street
systems as well as highway safety, driver education,
and tourist promotion programs. The section also
provides that the legislature, by a three-fifths vote
in each house, may divert the earmarked funds to
other uses. Thus it is conceivable-although perhaps
unlikely-that sometime in the future highways will
not be automatically funded at the expense of other
badly needed public services.
When it came to the investment of public funds,
the convention abandoned its hand-off policy and
included several restrictions which might better have
been left to the judgment of the legislature. No public money except retirement funds could be invested
in private corporate capital stock. The public school
fund and the permanent funds of the university system could be invested only in "public securities of
the state, its subdivisions, local government units, and
districts within the state, or bonds of the United
States, or other securities fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States, or such other
safe investments bearing a fixed rate of interest as
may be provided by law.'' There are honest differences of opinion as to how state money should be invested, and few would disagree with the idea that
security of funds should be the first consideration.
Many experts would contend that such limitations
should be left to the legislature and that in years to
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come investment opportunities other than public or
fixed rate securities may represent prudent and safe
investments. Surely when tax moneys are so hard
to come by, a constitutional limitation that may in the
future restrict nontax income sorely needed by state
and local governments seems ill advised.
A Few Regrets: Section 12 of the revenue and finance article requires the legislature to "insure strict
accountability of all revenue received and money
spent by the state and counties, cities, towns, and all
other local government entities." Montana citizens
interested in what happens to their tax money might
wish that another sentence requiring a uniform accounting system for all state and local agencies had
been added. Until such a system is installed (and it
can be done by statute), we will never have a complete picture of overall government expenditures in
Montana. And until we know how our money is
being spent, we cannot begin to understand what is
going on, or to demand true accountability from our
state and local governments.
Overall-Worthy of· Support: If one does indeed
believe in representative government and has enough
faith in future legislatures to wish that they may
legislate with some degree of flexibility, then the
new revenue and finance article represents progress.
Among the things it permits or directs the legislature
to do, which it cannot do under. the old constitution,
are:
1. Provide for property tax administration at the
state level.
2. Exempt property from taxation.
3. Levy property taxes for state purposes.
4. Provide for independent appeal procedures for
taxpayer grievances.
5. Overrule the earmarking of revenue for highway purposes, but only by a three-fifths vote of
the members of each house.
6. Create state debt, by a two-thirds vote of the
members of each house.
But there are also limitations on the actions of both
state and local governments. Lest any reader be apprehensive that the new constitution provides license
for improvidence, the limitations, too, deserve summarizing. Among other things, the proposed constitution forbids:
1. An unbalanced budget.
2. The creation of debt to cover budget deficits.
3. The use of borrowed funds (state or local) for
any purpose other than that specified in the authorizing law.
4. The payment of money from the state treasury
without an appropriation.
5. The investment of state money (except retire..:
ment funds) in corporate stock.
And the legislature is directed to require strict accountability of all revenue received and money spent
by all state and local governmental units.

Environment and Resources
William Tomlinson
Coordinator, Student Environmental
Research Center
Professor Clarence Gordon
Director of Environmental Studies Program
University of Montana, Missoula
The draft constitution offers a substantively new
article on environment and natural resources where
there is no comparable provision in the present constitution.
Provisions of the proposed Article IX omit almost
entirely the features of an article submitted by delegate Louise Cross, along with other proposals sub~
mitted by lobbying environmentalists, but the article
still has merit compared with coverage of such matters in the present constitution. The proposals are
conservative, but not ultra-conservative, and they
·:are thus worthy of consideration by responsible citizens of Montana.
This review is submitted by two environmentalists
who concede limited ability to interpret these provisions from a legal point of view. The perspective
is the extent to which the proposed constitutional
language on environment and natural resources may
reasonably be expected to advance the environmental goals declared in the document.
A provision that "The state and each person shall
maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future generations"
is potentially the most sweeping proposal. It puts the
burden of maintaining a livable environment upon
the citizens of the state yet fails, without legal interpretation or statutory amplification of the statement,
to set forth clearly what legal recourse citizens
would have against those who knowingly and willingly degrade the environment.
There is provision for the reclamation of land disturbed by taking natural resources such as coal and
hard rock minerals. A vast area of the land surface
of Montana overlays coal reserves which it is now
economically feasible to recover. But the delegates
treated the subject lightly with a two-sentence provision that leaves to the legislature the entire burden
of setting standards and of providing administration
of such reclamation. Power company lobbyists did
their job well on this subject of r eclamation as did
agricultural and industrial lobbyists on the water
rights provisions.
All of the present provisions on water rights are
retained, but the convention refused to include recreation as a beneficial use of water. We believe there
is no reason for concerned citizens to accede to the
convention's apparent assumption that recreation is
not a beneficial use of water. We believe that future
citizen pressure will gain full recognition of recreation as a beneficial use of water.
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A significant new provision would place all waters
of the state-surface, underground, flood and atmospheric-in trust. As trustee the state would have
responsibility to manage the appropriations and uses
of this water. Another provision declares that the
legislature shall provide for the control, administration and centralized records of water use. These provisions come at a critical time for a western state. In
1968 Congress enacted the Colorado River Basin
Project Act. As stated in this legislation "the secretary of the interior shall conduct full and complete
reconnaissance investigations for the purpose of developing a general plan to meet the future water
needs of the western United States. Such investigations shall include the long-range water supply available and the long-range water requirements in each
water resource region of the western United States."
At the present time Montana water records are kept
in their respective counties. This provision will facilitate the conduct of such an inventory allowing
for a more complete and accurate estimate of the
available water in the state.
An inventory is also critical because estimates of
the consumption requirements of the power-generation and coal-gasification industries planned for
Montana and Wyoming will require approximately
75 per cent of the available water resources within
a 13-state area bounded by Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota and North
Dakota.
Another section of the draft constitution covers
resources such as cultural, scenic, recreational and
historic areas which the legislature shall identify,
acquire, restore and administer. This provision has
much potential benefit for the environment if citizens inform and force the legislature fully to implement it.
As with most older constitutions, environmental
concern was largely unrecognized in the 1889 Montana constitution. The emphasis then was on resource development.- Constitutions of the past decade, however, have increasingly recognized environmental degradation and have reflected this awareness in their language.
In 1970 Illinois included an "Environment" article
~n a new constitution. This article mandates the legislature and each person of the state to achieve and
maintain a healthful environment and commands the
legislature to provide necessary regulations to implement this general policy. The article further recognizes each person's right to a healthful environment
and provides that each person may enforce this right
through legal proceedings. The more conservative
approach of the Montana draft constitution may be
compared to provisions from the new Illinois constitution which state (Article XI):
Section 1. Public Policy-Legislative Responsibility:
The public policy of the state and the_duty of each person is to provide and maintain a healthful environment

for the benefit of this and future generations. The General Assembly shall provide by law for the implementation and enforcement of this policy.
Section 2. Rights of Individuals: Each person has the
right to a healthful environment. Each person may enforce this right against any party, governmental or private, through appropriate legal -proceedings subject to
reasonable limitation and regulation as the General
Assembly may provide by law.

More recently the North Dakota constitutional
convention adopted a similar article. These rights
and responsibilities are being recognized with increasing frequency by state legislatures throughout
the United States that still operate within the framework of an older constitution.
Michigan adopted an environmental protection act in
1971. In the words of its author Joseph Sax, its purposes are threefold: "to recognize the public right to a
decent environment as an enforceable legal right; to
make it enforceable by private citizens suing as members
of the public; and to set the stage for the development
of a common law of environmental quality."
The Michigan act states: "The attorney general, [or
any other specified] legal entity may maintain an action
in the district court having jurisdiction where the elleged violation occurred or is likely to occur ... against
the state, any political subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the state or other [specified] legal
entity for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction."

We believe that statements recognizing the need for
environmental safeguards in the Montana draft constitution will provide an important stimulus to future legislatures. Rather than precluding legislative
action, it frequently commands that "the legislature
shall provide ..." The scope and strength of legislation is, therefore, discretionary with the legislature.
Article IX of the proposed constitution does not
clearly state individual authority to implement its
obligations (as do articles of the Illinois and North
Dakota constitutions) . However, Article II Section
3, on inalienable rights, states: "All persons 'are born
free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful environment
... and seeking their safety, health and happiness in
all ~awful w~ys." The nature of action which may be
enlisted to implement these rights will be decided
by the legislature and courts of Montana. It is our
?elief .that this lang~age in the declaration of rights
is eqmvalent to Sect10n 2 of the Illinois constitution
and should be so interpreted.
Article IX of the draft constitution is a far cry
from articles on the environment that were proposed
to. th~ convention. However, unlike the present constitut10n, the draft provisions recognize and allow
~egislatiye and citizen action on many issues concernmg environment and natural resources. While we
believe that it is a conservative article as are most
other articles in the proposed constituti~n, the whole
proposed constitution deserves support by the citizens of Montana.
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Local Government
Robert E. Eagle
Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of Montana, Missoula
Constitutional provisions for local government
should further the basic objectives of the various
units of government. These objectives include adequate services, efficient management and responsiveness to the needs of the public. A key condition to
achieve these objectives is the recruitment and continued service of qualified and competent personnel.
State constitutions allow local governments to do
certain things, require them to do certain things, and
prevent them from doing certain things. Within these
limits, the structure and operations of local governments are defined by state legislation, by local ordinances and administration, and by voters of the localities.
County Government: Montana's present constitution prescribes the structure of county government in
great detail. These provisions have been widely criticized as putting unnecessary limits on the ability of
counties to revise their government in response to
changing needs. But persons who have made service
in county government their life's work value the job
security that these provisions afford.
The great diversity among Montana's countiessome growing, some declining in population; some
populous, others with few people-suggests that the
possibility of change in county government structure is desirable as the needs of particular counties
change. The local government article of the draft
constitution affords some flexibility. The traditional
commissioner form now in use is specifically retained
as one option. The legislature can provide for any
number of other options. (The draft constitution does
not mention the county manager form of government
now in use in Petroleum County. The legislature
could continue this form as an option.)
Counties are currently more restriCted in their
powers than cities are. The draft constitution allows
(but does not require) the legislature to grant counties legislative powers.
City Government: Cities and towns received little
consideration in the 1889 Montana Constitution. But
Montana courts have applied "Dillon's Rule" that municipalities are legal creatures of the state with only
those powers delegated by the legislature, or clearly
implied from such delegated powers, or essential to
the continued functioning of the city.
A 1922 amendment _to the present constitution allows the state legislature to provide for any type of
city government structure it wishes, and it has authorized three forms-mayor..:council ( aldermanic),
commission-manager, and commission. But a general
grant of authority for a locality to devise its own form

of government (one meaning of "home rule") has not
been an available option.
Charters and Local Self Government Powers: The
draft constitution provides some new options to both
cities and counties for local charters and for self government powers. The term "local government" in the
draft constitution refers to counties, incorporated
cities and towns, and to other local government units
which may be established by law. The charter provisions and local self government powers can be extended to all "local government units" as thus defined.
The local charter provisions of the draft constitution would allow a local government unit to adopt a
charter creating its own unique structure of government. If approved by the voters, the governmental
unit could exercise any charter powers not specifically denied by the state constitution or by state legislation. In other words, considerably more local selfgovernment power can be granted than under the
present constitution. The needs and problems of the
larger cities and counties are sufficiently complex
that this charter provision seems desirable even if
exercised by only one or two of them. Smaller municipalities and counties could remain within one of the
optional forms prescribed by the legislature. Some
observers doubt whether smaller local units should
have charter powers.
It has been suggested by some that local discretion
might lead to fiscal irresponsibility. The present state
constitution places a rigid percentage on the amount
of debt that can be incurred by cities and counties.
The draft constitution would drop this rigid limit but
allow the state legislature to place limits on local
debt, thus providing a statewide check that would be
easier to revise for changed conditions than the current constitutional limitation.
Powers to be Liberally Construed: If local governments do not choose to adopt charters, there is still
a possibility that they will be able to exercise more
authority than presently. Relating to local governments that have not undertaken self-government
powers, the proposed constitution states that "The
powers of incorporated cities and towns and counties
shall be liberally construed." This provision is intended to modify judicial application of Dillon's Rule
with regard to cities and to relieve restrictive interpretation of constitutional provisions affecting counties. No major shift in the relations between the
state and localities is intended; it is intended that
courts shall give the benefit of the doubt to authority
of units of local government in "gray areas." As the
local government committee of the convention put it,
local governments need "more elbow room to act."
Consolidation: Some Montana cities or counties
may wish to obtain greater efficiency of operations
by consolidation of cities, of city and county, or of
counties. Such consolidation is possibl~ under the
present Montana constitution, with voter approval,
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and this possibility is retained in the draft constitution. The new provision would allow consolidation
by a majority of electors voting where the present
requirement is a majority of all electors registered.
The draft constitution includes a new provision which
makes it possible for two or more local government
units to share the services of any officer or facilities
unless such sharing is prohibited by law or charter.
Local Initiative and Referendum: The present
Montana constitution does not provide for initiative,
referendum, or recall procedures at the local level.
The draft constitution requires the legislature to provide for local initiative and referendum, but it does
not mention recall of officials.
Other Local Government Units: Special districts,
an increasingly important form of local government
in Montana, are not specifically mentioned in the
draft constitution. However there are provisions for
"other local government units." Such units have
powers provided by law under the draft constitution,
and the local charter and self-government options
could be made available to any of these other units of
local government. The legislature would provide procedures as for cities and counties, and voter approval
would be required.
Review of Local Government Structure: If the proposed constitution is adopted, each local government
will be required to conduct a review of its governmental structure within four years. This review
would place an alternative to the present structure
before the voters for their acceptance or rejection.
The draft constitution does not specify how this "alternative" must differ from the present structure.
Minor alterations as well as major changes presumable would qualify.
This review proposal strikes a middle ground between requiring change for local government structures and merely permitting options which the legislature might authorize. Each locality would be required to ask itself whether present arrangements are
satisfactory. With this prod from the constitution,
some local governments are apt to see some improvements they would like to make. The state legislature
will be expected to spell out procedures to be followed in the review process.
After this first review, another would be required
every ten years. The subsequent reviews need not
place an alternative on the ballot.
Summary: The draft constitution would remove
several restrictions on local governments and give
more discretion both to the legislature and to local
governments if they choose to exercise it. Given the
diversity of Montana communities and the substantial
changes reasonably expected in coming decades such
flexibility seems advisable. Nothing proposed ~ould
pre:ve~t the voters at th~ ~ocal level from protecting
their mterests. More efficiency could be achieved in
local government by the kind of flexibility embodied
in the proposed article on local government.

Education
Dean J. Francis Rummel
The School of Education
University of Montana, Missoula
Educational Goals and Duties: The education article declares a worthy goal for educational policy-a
goal the citizens of Montana can seek with pride and
satisfaction. It has tremendous implications and represents an enlightened and long-range viewpoint by
those who drafted the constitution. It projects a system of education which will develop the "full potential of each person" regardless of age from early
childhood through advanced age. There is assurance
that the legislature will "fund and distribute in an
equitable manner to the school districts the state's
share of the costs of the basic elementary and secondary school system." Other educational institutions
and educational programs may be provided as the
legislature deems desirable.
For the first time there is a definite recognition of
the "distinct and unique cultural heritage of the
American Indians," and the state is committed in its
educational goals to the "preservation of their cultural integrity." This would tend to redress old
wrongs and restore hope and dignity to a proud and
deserving people.
In recognition of the rights of all individuals, and
to prevent unfair treatment, the non-discrimination
in education provision (Section 7) has been substantially broadened. While the 1889 constitution bars
discrimination on account of sex, the revised section
would bar discrimination by reason of race creed
religion, political beliefs, and national origin'.
'
Coordination and Administration of Public Educa~ion: One of the more controversial, and yet greater
I~J?rovements over the 1889 constitution is the prov1s10n for a state board of education composed of
(1) the board of regents of higher education and (2)
t~e board of public education. In reality, this is a
single qoard of education, with two equal-sized divisions, responsible for the development of an educational philosophy for the state, the establishment of
educational policies, the determination of long-range
plan~, and the development of a unified budget for
fundmg of education. This unified state board of education would provide for the coordination and evaluation of all educational programs of the state and the
development of an integrated system of education for
persons of all ages.
However, for purposes of supervision and management, the state board of education would be subdivided into two sub-boards, each consisting of seven
~embers. The board of regents of higher education would be responsible for supervision coordination, management, and control of the Mont~na system
of hig~er education; the other, a board of public
educat10n would be responsible for supervision of
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the public elementary and secondary school system.
Since philosophies, purposes, and educational programs differ somewhat between so-called "higher
education" and "elementary and secondary education," the provision for two separate divisions within
the state board of education will make it possible
to appoint members of the boards who have special
competence and interest in the different areas.
This arrangement would also encourage coordination and administration of areas and programs of
education that are not specifically identified as "college programs" or "elementary and secondary education," but which might include education for the aged,
adult education, vocational-technical education, and
early childhood education. That is, the proposed constitution makes it possible for the state board of education to allocate aspects of these and other programs
to the sub-board which may be best suited for their
management, supervision and coordination. There
need no longer be controversy over who has "control"
or who is to be "funded" since the single state board
of education will be responsible for the delegation of
authority and the submission of a unified budget for
funding all of its various programs.
While the board of public education has the responsibility to supervise the public elementary and
secondary school system, the proposed constitution
provides for local control through school district
trustees (Section 8). This section would require the
election of local school boards as provided by law.
That is, school district trustees could now be elected
along with other officials in local, county, state, or
national elections rather than in a special election.
Husbanding of Resources for the Funding of Education: The draft constitution continues protection of
the public school fund (Section 2), guarantees that
the public school fund shall forever remain inviolate
(Section 3), continues constitutional status for the
board of land commissioners (Section 4), assures
equitable apportionment of the income from school
lands to public elementary and secondary school districts (Section 5), and provides constitutional direction for the holding and disposal of public lands (Section 11). The funds of the Montana university system
are to remain inviolate and sacred to the purposes for
which they were dedicated (Section 10).
In addition to provisions for protection of dedicated funds, as indicated above, the article provides
for the investment of public funds. It would guarantee that the public school fund and the permanent
funds of the Montana university system and all other
state institutions of learning shall be safely and conservatively invested in public securities of the state,
bonds of the United States, or other safe investments
bearing a fixed rate of interest.
The state auditor would serve on the state board
of land commissioners along with the governor, superintendent of public instruction, secretary of state,
and attorney general who presently comprise the

board. It would seem that considerable care has been
exercised to provide for continuing major support of
the goals set forth in the constitution.
The draft constitution has continued the ban on
state aid to sectarian schools (Section 6), either direct
or indirect. However, draft provisions would allow
the state to distribute federal funds expressly earmarked for non-public education. This provides for
recognition of non-public educational efforts to maintain the state's responsibility, and allocation of its
resources to meet the laudable goals established in
Section 1.
In general, the proposed education article sets
forth an ideal goal for education; provides considerable flexibility in the planning, coordination, and
management of educational programs; guarantees the
basic rights of all citizens; and protects dedicated resources for the support of education. This proposed
constitutional article can well serve the educational
needs of present and future generations in Montana.
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